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Abstract 
Right-wing populism has spread across the European continent during the 21th century, this 
paper examines if this also is the case on the social media platform Facebook. Through the use 
of multivariate ordinary linear regression models the thesis seeks to answer if right-wing 
populist parties and leaders in 12 western European countries generate more followers on their 
official Facebook accounts than their non-populist competitors. The thesis finds that in both the 
case of political parties and political leaders the right-wing populists generate on average a 
larger number of followers. In addition to the findings a theory of possible explanatory value is 
presented which is based on emotional political participation. The fundamental idea is that 
people perform low-cost political actions because of anxiety, and this anxiety is caused by 
different politically charged subjects. What this means is that right-wing populists may attain 
support on Facebook because citizens feel anxious about the subjects that the populists control, 
however this anxiety may never turn into actual votes. 
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1. Introduction 
 
During the past decade, social media has become an integrated part of modern life. With this 
exceptional growth social media has transformed into a relevant and efficient tool for 
organizations and businesses alike to connect with the public. Political parties now 
strategically communicate with the public through social media platforms and the public is 
offered the possibility to interact with the parties online. A basic function of Facebook is the 
interaction of liking something. Liking something is a low-investment action of showing 
support for someone or something. A like can be an indication of support and they can be 
considered a form of political engagement. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the 
political parties and political party leaders of 12 European countries and to what extent they 
have generated followings on the social media platform Facebook. This is done to study if 
right-wing populist parties across Europe have larger followings than their competitors. This 
thesis aims to answer the following question:  
Do right-wing populist parties generate more support on Facebook than their competitors? 
To determine which of the political parties that can be defined as right-wing populists the 
thesis will base its statements concerning political affiliation on Cas Muddes work on political 
populism. The remaining parties of the study will not be defined in any larger extent other 
than being a non-populist party. To perform the study a data collection has be done where the 
generated likes of each countries relevant political parties and leaders have been accounted 
for. Each country within the dataset consists of a minimum of six parties and a maximum of 
12. The dataset in its entirety consist of 100 political parties and 99 political leaders.  
 To answer the question as to whether right-wing populist parties generate more 
support on Facebook than their competitors, ordinary linear regressions have been conducted. 
Through the analyses we find that there indeed is a correlation between being a right-wing 
populist party and generating a larger number of likes on Facebook. The analysis also 
provides statistical proof that that right-wing populist party leaders generate more likes than 
their counterparts among the non-populist parties. The independent variables of the regression 
analyses consist of the following four: right-wing populism, population, share of the votes in 
the most recent election and the percental change between the most recent election and the 
one before that. It should be pointed out that this analysis only concerns itself with 12 western 
European countries and hence it would be of interest to test the thesis on other countries and 
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continents to strengthen the possibility of generalization. This process could further ensure the 
validity of the thesis analysis results. The difference in political parties per country is a result 
of limiting each country to consist of parties with seats in parliament and/or seats in any 
institution except municipalities. The reason behind this is simply that there are hundreds of 
parties in each country and the study would not have been able to be conducted within the 
current format.  
 Currently the author has found no other studies that statistically determine that 
right-wing populist parties and leaders generate more support on social media platforms than 
other political parties. However, there are studies that focus on what impact social media has 
had on the political arena. Studies of interest that more specifically centers on subjects 
connected to this thesis are Fabio Gigliettos1 study on Facebook-likes and the possibility to 
predict electoral results based on data from social media platforms. The study performed by 
Jakob Baek Kristensen2 presents a theory that it is possible to predict electoral results from a 
single Facebook-like with an accuracy greater than previous academical works. These studies 
accentuate the impact of Facebook-likes and stresses the importance of social media in the 
modern political sphere. 
 This thesis will be constructed with a background segment where the current 
situation concerning political parties use of social media in western Europe will be 
introduced. Following this the paper will discuss relevant research done in the field of social 
media and politics. The paper will then present the dataset and the methodology that has been 
the foundation of the thesis. Finally, the paper will exhibit the results and the conclusions 
found through the conducted research.  
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1 Giglietto, Fabio, If Likes Were Votes: An Empirical Study on the 2011 Italian Administrative Elections, published 
2012-05-07, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1982736 (Accessed 2017-12-13) 
2 Baek Kristensen, Jakob, Parsimonious data: How a single Facebook like predicts voting behavior in multiparty 
systems, published 2017-09-20, http://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0184562 
(Accessed 2017-12-13) 
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2. Background 
 
The parties that have been included in this study are represented in political organs from 
Finland in the north to Italy in the south. When studying the different countries and their 
political representatives it was made clear that close to 100% of them have official accounts 
across several social media platforms. The one platform that stood out as the most commonly 
used was Facebook and thus is was decided that it would be the social media platform at the 
center of this thesis. From the data collection it was possible to determine that across Europe 
political parties from all party families were active on social media. Some more than others 
but it can be concluded that there are official accounts controlled by employees of political 
parties in all countries included in the study. Consequently, it is possible to state that social 
media is part of the strategical and political work of political parties. The countries included 
in the study are Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Norway, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, 
France, Portugal, Italy, Austria and the United Kingdom. The collection of data has been 
based on number of likes found on the official accounts of the political parties on Facebook.   
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3. Previous Research 
 
In this section I will in depth present the current research that exists on social media within 
the political field. The studies that are presented are of importance to establish the relevance 
of the thesis but also to strengthen my claims that social media is a form of political 
engagement. These studies are not exclusively focused on right-wing populism or the parties 
that can be labeled as right-wing populist parties, however their results are based upon using 
the same likes that I have used for this thesis.  
 
3.1 Political participation and engagement  
 
To engage politically as a citizen of a society has since a long time ago been defined by 
actions performed in a none-digitalized era. The most rudimentary of political engagement 
stems back to the creation of the concept of democracy. Voicing opinions, taking to the streets 
and gathering allies in order to influence the political elite. As history has progressed so has 
the possibilities of political engagement and participation. The foundation of democracy is 
grounded in the idea that the people decide, these decisions are performed by different types 
of voting. Voting is possibly the highest of investments for the average citizen in a society. 
The vote cast will affect the individual in several aspects. Therefor the political participation 
of voting can be perceived as a path for the individual to reach great benefits, so long as 
his/hers preferred party gains power. Knowing what to vote for involves costs for the 
individual, costs which have been studied within the field of rational choice for example. 
Michael Laver3 presents these net costs and states that deciding what to vote for is a process 
of searching for relevant information. It is also a possibly frustrating ordeal in making more 
profound decisions of political affiliation. Finally, it will for the majority of a country’s 
population require the individual to leave his/her home and vote for the preferred party or 
politician.4 What Laver proposes is that voting has costs, and questions if a rational individual 
would ever vote, since the one single vote never has proven to be determining in any election. 
                                                          
3 Laver, Michael, Private desires, political action: an invitation to the politics of rational choice, SAGE, 
London, 1997, p. 92. 
4 Ibid, p. 93. 
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This is referred within the rational choice theory literature as “the pardox that ate rational 
choice”. These statements have also been proposed by Hanna Bäck et al.5, however they 
attempt to offer explanations as to why people, how irrational it may seem, vote. They are 
testing two different solutions to the paradox, these two are collective incentives and selective 
incentives. Collective incentives can be summarized as a solution wherein individuals do not 
believe that their political engagement is irrelevant and that it will have political impact. The 
selective incentives can be summarized as a solution wherein there are benefits for an 
individual who political engages separated from the political outcome of said engagement. 
Their findings show that both solutions are present when understanding political engagement 
and action.6  
 
3.2 Emotional political participation 
 
Political participation and behavior has been studied to understand how people function when 
faced with politically charged subjects and their feelings concerning them. Nicholas A. 
Valentino et al.7 provides research on the impact of emotion upon individuals rate of political 
engagement. Through an extensive survey where individuals were asked how they felt 
emotionally concerning the current situation in their country it was possible to predict that 
anger, rather than anxiety will active and mobilize individuals politically. An essential 
question for the study was to find the answer as to how the public felt about the current 
situation not the current politicians or parties. They analyze the responses to the survey by 
applying cognitive appraisal theory of emotions. Cognitive appraisal theory of emotions 
suggest that positive and negative emotional responses will affect individual choice in 
different ways. When this is combined with neuroscience based research, it can be said that 
anger triggers a certain behavior and anxiety triggers other ones8. What the study presents is 
that anger will mobilize individuals rather than anxiety. However, it does suggest that anxiety 
will trigger low-cost expressive actions. It further states that these actions are consistently 
                                                          
5 Bäck, Hanna, Teorell, Jan, Westholm, Anders, Explaining Modes of Participation: A Dynamic Test of 
Alternative Rational Choice Models, Scandinavian political studies, 2011. 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-9477.2011.00262.x/abstract (Accessed 2017-12-13) 
6 Ibid, s. 74-93 
7 Valentino, A. Nicholas, et al. Election Night’s Alright for Fighting: The Role of Emotions in Political 
Participation, The Journal of politics, published 2011-01-14, 
http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1017/s0022381610000939?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents (accessed 2017-12-
05), p. 157. 
8 Ibid, p. 159. 
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connected to emotion-coping where the individual seeks social support and discusses his/hers 
fears with family and friends. The conclusion is that anxiety may not trigger high-cost 
participation, yet it will boost low-cost participation. Furthermore, political expression has 
been shown to correlate with the feeling of anxiety in surveys.9 
Looking at political engagement from the presented perspectives it can be said 
that they are applicable on an extensive period throughout history, but it does not concern 
itself with the digitalized world we live in today. This thesis introduces a new digital political 
landscape where political engagement does not involve supporting the one political entity you 
vote for, nor fighting the political entity you consider your competitors. This text will argue 
that individuals support political parties and leaders which they do not vote for, in order to 
express anxiety concerning a specific subject.   
 
3.3 Political engagement online 
 
A study carried out by Kristensten et al., conducted quantitative research in order to determine 
if Facebook-likes can be an indicator of voting behavior within a multiparty system.10 Initially 
a dataset was constructed by collecting data from official accounts of Danish politicians and 
parties within a set timeframe of two years. The study is carried out by comparing 
multinomial logistic regression models created from the dataset. Through the comparison 
conclusions could be drawn as to whether it was possible to determine how a specific person 
would vote. To summarize what the analysis contributes with is that through observing the 
behavior of individuals on Facebook it is possible, by tracking their likes, which party they 
will vote for. This study is presenting actual predictions something this thesis does not intend 
to do, however this study does point out that likes on Facebook are a new form of political 
engagement and they are of value. The authors also propose that likes on social media cannot 
be defined as cost-free political engagement that are carelessly used. It is rather the opposite 
way, that a like indicates that either one or several political ideas held by a politician or a 
political party is shared by the individual.11  
                                                          
9 Ibid, p. 159. 
10 Kristensen et al., p. 1. 
11 Ibid, p. 9. 
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Fabio Giglietto (2012) conducted a study within the same field as Kristensten et 
al, researching if it is possible to predict electoral results from Facebook-likes-12 His study 
was carried out using data collected from the 2011 administrative elections in Italy, this data 
consisted of official Facebook accounts controlled by a political party or politician. In this 
paper Giglietto presents a background to contextualize the presence of social media within the 
political field. Through previous research Giglietto states that the political engagement 
between individual on social media is different from what we know as “face-to-face”.13 When 
performing the majority of possible actions on social media platforms you are not engaging in 
a face-to-face interaction. There is a relevant difference between talking to your friends in you 
home and talking to your friends on Facebook. The traditionally communication of talking to 
someone does not leave traces, online interaction and conversation does.14 However, it is 
possible to state that the concept of “friends and family” now exists online as well as offline, 
which makes it possible for individuals to discuss private matters in public spaces. Few would 
argue that the conversations taking place within ones’ home is to be considered public, and 
few would argue that engagement on Facebook pages and profiles are private. Giglietto also 
presents us with the idea of electoral performance in relation to popularity on Facebook. The 
choice of words is relevant here as the definition of what a “like” indicates has been debated 
among schoolers studying social media. This will be further discussed in a future segment of 
the thesis. Another important aspect that Giglietto anticipates, and many with him, is that 
Facebook will become a more frequently used strategical tool for politicians. The text was 
published in 2012 and as this thesis dataset has found that almost every single politician and 
political party has an official Facebook account it does seem as if Gigliettos prediction was 
quite accurate.    
 Apart from these two studies on online participation there has been research 
performed on young people and their activities within political engagement. When discussing 
political science in everyday conversation it is often said that young people are the ones 
actively using the different platforms. This is a statement that is true and has been proven by 
demographical research upon the social media platforms currently being used, stating that 
88% of people between the age of 18-29 are actively using Facebook.15 However, usage does 
                                                          
12 Giglietto et al., p. 1. 
13 Ibid, p. 4. 
14 Ibid, p. 2. 
15 Duggan, Meave, Greenwood, Shannon, Perrin, Andrew, Social Media Updated 2016, Pew Research Center, 
published 2016-11-11, http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/11/11/social-media-update-2016/ (Accessed 2017-12-
15) 
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not concern the political categories of accounts and profiles on social media. Social media has 
according to Avril Keating and Gabriella Mellis16 not become a groundbreaking tool for 
young people to engage politically. Their study found that youth who are politically involved 
outside of social media will be engaged online, but in general, social media has not gathered a 
new group of young people and found a way to activate them politically.17 A variable often 
introduced as problematic when talking about the social media is age. It can however be seen 
through demographical researches within the field of marketing and strategical 
communication that the use of social media is widespread and excludes no age category.18 
However, I encourage a study to be performed where age is a variable, to test if age alters the 
results found.  
 
 
  
                                                          
16 Keating, Avril, Melis, Gabriella, Social media and youth political engagement: Preaching to the converted or 
providing a new voice for youth, The British Journal of politics and international relations, published 2017-07-
07, http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/1369148117718461 (Accessed 2017-12-10) 
17 Ibid, p. 882-891. 
18 Chaffey, Dave, New Global Social Media Research, Smart Insights, published 2017-04-27, 
https://www.smartinsights.com/social-media-marketing/social-media-strategy/new-global-social-media-research/ 
(Accessed 2017-12-20) 
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4. Theory 
 
Right-wing populist parties and their leaders generate more likes than their competitors on 
Facebook. Translating “likes” into votes is not of importance for this thesis, however previous 
literature in the field of political engagement on social media has shown that it can be of 
relevance. Translating votes into likes without considering any variables lead us to different 
conclusions. Taking the example of Sweden it would be presumed that the right-wing populist 
party the Swedish Democrats (Sverigedemokraterna) would be the party winning the 
upcoming election. Whether this I true or not is of course impossible to say, however 
proposing and predicting that they would win based on their likes on Facebook would mean 
raising their vote share of 12,90% to that of the Social Democrats which was 31%. This thesis 
does not propose such a thing happening yet still the Swedish Democrats remain the largest 
party on Facebook in Sweden. It could be established by this study that right-wing populist 
parties and party leaders across Europe on average generate more likes, yet in some countries 
they do not hold more than 3% of the vote share. In the case of Belgium, Vlaams Belange 
have, as of November 2017, 87.733 likes on their official Facebook account with 3,7% of the 
vote share in the last election. This makes them the second largest party on Facebook in the 
case of Belgium only beaten by the party with the largest vote share, which is the New 
Flemish Alliance with 20,3%.  
 
4.1 Costs and cognitive appraisal theory 
 
Because of these findings this thesis proposes that individuals through the low-cost 
investment of liking a party or a politician on Facebook engage and supports parties which 
they do not vote for. To strengthen this idea and to perhaps offer an explanation as to why this 
would occur the thesis will present a theory based in parts on the idea behind rational choice 
theory and cognitive appraisal theory of emotions. Rational choice theory presents at its 
foundation a set of costs connected to political engagement.19 It is important to state that this 
thesis does not argue that voting and “liking” is in any way synonym, the political action of 
voting comes with a much higher cost than “liking” does. However, both of them would be 
considered supportive and not neutral. Cognitive appraisal theory of emotion suggests that 
anger and anxiety lead to different types of behavior.20 The difference between anger and 
                                                          
19 Laver, p. 92. 
20 Valentino et al., p. 161. 
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anxiety is that of mobilization. A person filled with anger may leave their home and join a 
demonstration, an individual who feels anxiety will avoid such an action. However, a person 
who avoids a high-cost engagement such as a demonstration will instead engage in 
conversations with family and friends concerning the subject that caused the anxiety. Studies 
have also shown that a person who is anxious concerning something tends to express 
themselves politically.21  
The theories presented this far are theories based on research conducted on data 
collected from offline engagements and interactions. This thesis intends to combine these with 
findings from research done on social media platforms, and thus apply these theories on 
political behavior online. In the studies presented in “Previous Research” there are sections in 
each which are of relevance for this thesis theory section. In the study How a single Facebook 
likes predicts voting behavior in a multiparty system the authors can conclude from their 
research that Facebook likes are not cost-free engagement but rather a form of support for at 
least one idea, sometimes more, presented by a political party or politician. This text wishes to 
present the idea that it is true that Facebook-likes are not cost-free, yet they are not as costly 
as joining a party or going to the polls to vote. It would rather be that individuals who find a 
majority of their views and ideas represented by a political party will vote for that party, 
however it may be that the individual disagrees with the party it votes for in a specific matter. 
Since this study finds that right-wing populist gain larger followings on Facebook than others 
do, it proposes that people who feel anxious about a specific subject is willing to like a party 
on Facebook but would not vote for that party in an election. The question of immigration, 
asylum and refugees are highly debated and widespread subject that affects all countries in the 
world and currently Europe specifically. These questions have been the main purpose of the 
right-wing populists gaining grounds in the political arena. From this study it can be said that 
they also have gained grounds on social media to the extent where they even have surpassed 
their competitors. Voter X may have voted for conservative party Y for several years but now 
during a refugee crisis he has begun thinking about voting for the right-wing populist party 
based on the populist propaganda used when talking about the refugees. From that standpoint 
he decides to like them on social media, this is a low-cost engagement that changes little and 
requires little. When election day arrives however he decides to vote for the conservative 
party once again. The support for the right-wing populists concerning immigration, does not 
outweigh the support the voter shows for the conservative party. 
                                                          
21 Ibid, p. 159. 
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4.2 Pathways of communication 
 
What the larger followings imply is that these right-wing populist own pathways of 
communication to the personal social media accounts of more citizens than other parties. 
Even though “likes” do not necessarily translate into votes which in turn means actual 
political power, the process of connecting to a political party by “liking” opens possibilities 
for the populist party. They may not rule in government, but they seem to rule social media. 
Every Facebook post published by a political party will end up in the feed of the individuals 
who have liked the page of the party. What the party says in its posts will be presented, 
whether the individual wants to or not, to each follower of the Facebook account. The 
discussions will include more people, it will be able to generate more likes and more shares 
simply because the account has generated more followers. Even if they are not controlling 
office their message is getting out there, it is reaching people on larger scale than their 
competitors. These ideas are illustrated in the picture below. Anxiety creates Facebook 
support, Facebook support guarantees message delivery, what message delivery leads to is not 
in any way proven but the study suggests that making the public talk and owning the public 
room can possibly impact policy change and can generate votes. The proposed outcomes of 
Facebook support and Message delivery is visualized by the dashed lines in Figure 1.   
 
 
Figure 1 
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5. Methodology 
 
In this section the methodology behind the research conducted will be explained. It will 
present the dataset, the independent and dependent variables and finally the regression 
analysis performed.  
 
5.1 Dependent Variables   
 
Facebook-likes are obviously not static numbers and can at any given moment decrease or 
increase. The numbers used in this study may be, and most certainly is, slightly different from 
those presented in the dataset. Liking something is an action where an individual decides to 
show support for either a specific post or a specific page. As is evident of this study, and 
many before it, nearly all political parties in western Europe control an official Facebook 
page. In order to determine validity of these Facebook pages the collection is based on links 
of each political parties’ official website which redirects the user to the Facebook account. In 
cases where this was not possible the accounts have been considered valid if they have been 
granted a verification by Facebook. The verification is a tool which is implemented by 
Facebook to be able to determine the authenticity of accounts of public figures, politicians and 
celebrities.22 The number of likes generated by the account is accessible to all and is visible to 
anyone who visits the account page. It is to be pointed out that Facebook offers the possibility 
to like something, however within the action of liking a user will also be considered to 
actively follow a page. Following happens automatically when a user likes a page.  
 To generate answers as to whether right-wing populist parties and leaders 
generate more followers than their competitors a multivariate Ordinary Linear Square 
regression was performed. An Ordinary Linear Square (OLS) Regression is in its most basic 
explanation an evaluation of the relationship between a given variable and one or more other 
variables.23 In an OLS regression, or regressions in general, the axis are coded as dependent 
and independent variables. The dependent variable is assumed to be stochastic in its nature 
which means it has a probability distribution. The independent variable on the other hand is 
assumed to be of a fixed value which means it will remain the same in repeated samples.24 
                                                          
22 Facebook, Terms of verification, https://www.facebook.com/help/1288173394636262/?ref=u2u (Accessed 
2017-12-20) 
23 Brooks, C. Introductory Econometrics for Finance. 3rd edition. Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, p. 
27. 
24 Ibid, p. 28. 
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The regression analysis was chosen because it would be able to determine if right-wing 
populist parties and leaders generate larger followings. The dependent variables of the 
analysis is “Political parties Facebook likes” and “Political leaders Facebook likes”. The 
dependent variables are the collection of likes generated by the political parties and leaders 
across Europe which makes up the dataset. To measure right-wing political parties and 
leaders, it was necessary to define an independent variable that could function within the 
regression. In each country it was assumed that at least one political party and hence one (or 
possibly more) could be defined as a right-wing populist party or leader of one. The research 
done was based on Cas Muddes definitions of radical right-wing populists in Europe. Mudde 
defines the parties through a series of questions concerning, globalization, culture and 
socioeconomical matters. Through researching parties and answering the questions Mudde 
composes a list in which the parties defined as right-wing populists are presented.25 The 
definition is per definition based solely on previous research and if one would argue that 
Muddes definitions are flawed then of course the clams of this thesis would matter less and 
seem irrelevant. In the dataset the political parties and leaders were divided between right-
wing populist parties/leaders and the remaining parties, the numbers 0 and 1 in the dataset 
divides the two, the parties that were not considered populist were simply defined as being 
non-populist. The parties and leaders were then introduced into the regression to see what 
affect the independent variables would have upon the dependent variable. The regression 
would then be able to calculate how being a right-wing populist affects the number of likes 
generated.  
 
5.2 Control variables 
 
Three other independent variables were introduced to establish validity for the possible 
results. These three variables are “vote share”, “vote change” and “population”. It was 
obvious before proceeding with the regressions that there were major differences between 
political parties and leaders, and these differences were not only because of the differences in 
actual Facebook-likes. To account for any differences caused by population a collection of 
data concerning populations across the 12 countries were introduced. It was also clear that 
there were parties with larger success in generating actual votes in elections meanwhile others 
were gaining little to no support when people went to the polls. The study also introduces a 
                                                          
25 Mudde, Cas, Populist radical right parties in Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, p. 305.  
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variable which concerns the differences in parties’ electoral results between the latest 
elections. This was done to see if there was a relationship between increasing or decreasing in 
votes and the likes generated by political parties and leaders. 
  
5.3 Dataset 
 
The dataset used in this study has been created by collecting Facebook likes from 100 
political parties and 92 political leaders across 12 western European countries. To be included 
in the dataset the political party must be represented in their respective countries national 
parliament or represented in the European parliament. In the case of Sweden one exception 
has been made and that is the political party “Feministiskt Initiativ” because they do not 
represent right-wing populism yet cannot be defined as non-populist. The thesis will further 
explain this decision at a later stage. The data collection was carried out between the 14th of 
November and the 21 of November 2017. The countries included in the dataset are Sweden, 
Denmark, Finland, Norway, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, France, Portugal, Italy, 
Austria and the United Kingdom. Spain and Ireland have not been included in this study as 
they have often been referred to as deviant cases among the western European countries 
concerning the rise of the right-wing populist parties.26  It could be argued that Portugal 
should also be excluded from the study because of the same reasons, however when the 
research was conducted it could be seen that there indeed was a relevant number of likes for a 
right-wing populist party, which made that party the third largest on Facebook in Portugal.  
 
 Another aspect to bring forth is that of bots. A bot is an account not controlled 
by an individual but rather is a coded application which automatically runs scripts online.27 
This makes it possible to create large amounts of “fake accounts” which can like and follow a 
page without being represented by any individual. These likes and follows from fake accounts 
are sold in order for businesses to appear successful or active. For this thesis it has been ruled 
that if one political party uses this strategy it would be probable that the others do too. 
Furthermore, to determine validity of each account which has liked the political party or 
political leaders would be close to impossible given the current circumstances. Yet, the author 
of the thesis is aware of the possible issue of bots and “fake accounts”.  
                                                          
26 Buck, Tobias, No right turn for Spanish politics, Financial Times, published 2017-01-17, 
https://www.ft.com/content/414246f6-dbe4-11e6-86ac-f253db7791c6 (Accessed 2017-12-23) 
27 Dunham, Ken, Jim, Melnick, Malicious Bots: An Inside Look into the Cyber-Criminal Underground of the 
Internet, CRC Press, 2008, p. 6. 
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 In the case of a political party having more than one political leader the account 
with the most “likes” have been included in the dataset and the others removed, such is the 
case with a selection of the green parties in Europe. In cases where the party has been going 
through a problematic period and changed political leaders at several occasions within a small 
timeframe it has been ruled that the one with the largest number of likes will be selected. Such 
is the case of UK Independence Party. If a party has changed leader within the past three 
months (counting from the start of the data collection) the leader with the most likes has been 
selected. The few months of leadership offer little to no time for personal supportive 
interactions and hence cannot be representative for the actual support the party holds. This is 
the situation for the Swedish party “Moderaterna” and the German party “Alternative fur 
Deutschland”.  
 The dataset also consists of the following control variables vote share, vote 
change and population. By vote share the thesis implies the amount of votes a party generated 
in the latest election held in the country where the political party is active. Vote change is 
defined by the difference between the last two elections, hence showing if a party has 
increased or decreased between the elections. The data concerning the election results have 
been collected from each country’s electoral authority.28 The final variable is population 
which is each country’s population as recorded by the World Bank in 2016.29 
 
 
  
                                                          
28 Nordsieck, Wolfram, Parties & Elections, published 2017, http://www.parties-and-elections.eu/ (Accessed 
2017-12-02)  
29 World Bank group, Population, total, published 2016, https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.TOTL 
(Accessed 2017-12-02) 
17 
 
6. Results 
 
In this segment the results found when carrying out the analyses will be presented and 
explained. The study will do so by introducing descriptive summaries based on the dataset 
and charts visualizing the results found.  
 
6.1 The average party  
 
Initially a simple calculation was carried out to establish what the average political party and 
leader looked like. It was at that time established, as can be seen in table 1, that an average 
non-populist party within the dataset would have generated just above 100 000 likes or 
followers. Meanwhile the average right-wing populist party reached just under 200 000. This 
information was of interest as it made it possible to see what the average parties of both 
categories looked like. The SPÖ of Austria has 103 028 likes on Facebook and gained 26% of 
the votes in the latest election. The number of Facebook-like makes the party one of the 
closest to the average number. The party is a social democratic one, a party-type represented 
in many countries across Europe. It was founded in January 1889. Interestingly the right-wing 
populist party that is the closest to the average, with 161 000 likes, is a party which has leaned 
towards the populist ideas during a period and now is classified as one. The Norwegian 
“Fremskrittsparti” was founded in 1973 with a foundation built on classic liberal ideas but has 
since then moved towards the populist right. The party is almost 100 years younger than the 
average non-populist but not a young one among the right-wing populists. The average non-
populist party is one which held a fourth of the votes in the last election, represents one of the 
most common party families in Europe and has been a part of the political arena since the 19th 
century. The average right-wing populist party comes from a non-populist background, holds  
15% of the vote and has only been in the political arena for the past 40 years. This is 
illustrated in Table 1 
  
Variable Observations Std. dev.  Min Mean Max 
Non-Pop. P 99 172 054 609 100 812 1 098 443 
 
Non-Pop. L 92 466 321 1302 205 650 2 521 838 
 
Table 1 
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6.2 The average party leader 
 
If we instead look at the average political leader of this study it can be said that Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen of the liberal-conservative party “Venstre” in Denmark is representative of the 
average non-populist leader based on Facebook-likes. His number of likes is 203 000 which is 
slightly below the average, but he is the closest of all non-populist leaders of the study. Lökke 
Rasmussen’ party gained close to a fourth of the votes in the last election, they can be defined 
as part of a common party family and they were founded in 1870. When applying the same 
idea to the right-wing populist leaders and parties no single leader or party can be found close 
to the average. It can however be stated that out of the collected right-wing political parties 
the average generated number of likes reach slightly above 200 000, which the Norwegian 
“Fremskrittsparti” is the closest to represent. The political leader of a right-wing populist 
party has an average follower base slightly below 500 000 as can be seen in Table 2. As stated 
previously none of the 12 parties represent this number, which is not strange as the number of 
analyzed units are less than their non-populist counterpart. 
 
Table 2 
  
 
  
Variable Observations Std. dev.  Min Mean Max 
Populist P 12 193 896 2455 
 
203 346 
 
589 763 
 
Populist L 12 649 560 
 
4538 
 
496 231 
 
1 938 208 
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6.2 Model 1 
 
The first regression concerns the Facebook-likes generated by the political parties. The 
dependent variable in this case is “Political Parties’ Facebook Likes”. The independent 
variables for Model 1 are “right-wing populist party” (also referred to as radical right party 
when the research was conducted), “Vote Share”, “Vote Change” and “Population”.  
As is evident of Table 3 the right-wing party variable holds explanatory value. It 
can because of this result be concluded that right-wing populist parties generate a larger 
number of followers than their competitors. This is confirmed as the probability or statistical 
significance of the correlation is measured to 0.0095%. It can therefore be stated that being a 
right-wing populist party will, according to this analysis, generate a right-wing populist party 
more followers on average than a non-populist party. Examining the other variables, it is 
evident that political parties with a larger vote share will generate a larger number of votes. 
This statement is strengthened by a significance level of 0.0001%. Furthermore, it can also be 
stated that political parties within countries with larger populations seem to generate larger 
number of Facebook-likes. This can be strengthened by a significance level of 0.0000%. The 
last variable, vote change, is not statistically significant which implies that the performance of 
parties in elections does not affect the number of likes generated by the political parties. The 
adjusted R-squared number for the model is 0.51 which indicates that the independent 
variables have a high explanatory value for the dependent variable. The fact that the model 
achieves such a high number concerning the adjusted R-square indicates that the statement as 
a whole rest upon a firm foundation. It shall also be stated that the model can be further 
refined, but such a task will be left to future studies. An important aspect to be mentioned is 
that this model only includes 83 of the datasets 99 political parties, as some of the parties 
included in the dataset did not exist when the elections took place or had not gained enough 
votes to break the threshold of their respective countries, therefore making the variable of vote 
change and vote share not applicable.  
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Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -45401.98 2211.29 -2.052968 0.0434 
RW-Party 94809.65 35639.05 2.660274 0.0095 
Vote Share 5334.714 1289.553 4.136871 0.0001 
Vote Change 827.7169 1883.577 0.439439 0.6616 
Population 0.003250 0.000459 7.078647 0.0000 
Table 3 
 
The effect of vote share on the dependent variable was expected before the regression was 
carried out, and the significance level confirms that the notion of it having a large impact was 
not wrong. This is visualized in Figure 1. It can be clearly seen that a relationship between 
larger vote share and Facebook-likes exists and that it gradually rises the larger the vote share 
is. As mentioned this was expected and the variable has hence this performed in a desirable 
way. 
 
 
Figure 2 
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The control variable concerning population will not be visually presented as the results simply 
confirm that in highly populated countries parties run a higher chance of generating more 
likes.  
The regression analyses made it possible to predict the probability of the number 
of likes a political party may generate. This is illustrated in Figure 3. The prediction presented 
in Figure 3 assumes that the independent variables are held at specific values. The figure 
presents the dependent variable of Facebook Followers of Parties on its Y axis, and the 
independent variable of right-wing populism on its X axis. In this figure non-populist parties 
have been coded as “0” and acts as a dummy variable within the calculation. The “1” on the 
other hand are the right-wing populist parties included in the thesis dataset. The prediction 
intervals are in this figure represented by the red markings on each side. The predicted 
probabilities are represented within these two markings. As can been seen from the non-
populist variable we can expect that the average non-populist party will generate somewhere 
around 100 000 Facebook-likes on their official Facebook account. With the highest 
prediction reaching around 125 000 and the lowest around 15 000. The right-wing populist 
party variable tells us that we can expect somewhere between 190 000 and 200 000 followers 
for the average right-wing populist party. With the highest prediction reaching above 250 000 
and the lowest around 130 000. The highest prediction for the non-populist party is evidently 
not surpassing the lowest possible prediction of the right-wing populist party. The difference 
may not be a large one, yet it is statistically significant. The study can because of this confirm 
a correlation which indicates that right-wing populist parties generate more followers than 
their non-populist competitors.  
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Figure 3 
 
This of course raises the question as to why the right-wing populist parties are generating 
more followers. It also determines in extension that if a party was created within the set values 
that this regression is based upon a party which focuses on problematizing and claiming the 
subjects of immigration, Euroscepticism and nationalism will gain more Facebook-likes than 
one who does not. 
 
6.3 Model 2 
 
The second regression carried out, referred to as Model 2, concerns the political leaders of the 
dataset. The analysis consists of the same independent variables as in Model 1, the only 
difference is that of the dependent variable which now is “Political Leaders’ Facebook-likes”. 
Out of the 92 possible leaders to be included in the regression 78 observations were made. 
This as in the previous model because some parties did not exist at the latest elections. 
Once more it can be established that the variable representing right-wing 
populism holds explanatory value within the regression. With the results provided by Table 4 
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it can be said that the RW-leader variable’s level of significance is 0.0046, which is an even 
more positive relationship than that of the political parties. By stating this it is not intended in 
any way to propose that the results of Model 1 were not significant. What this means is that 
right-wing populist party leaders holds larger followings than their non-populist competitors.  
 
 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. 
Constant -213401.3 72965.41 -2.924692 0.0046 
RW-Leader 3367415 113230.1 2.973956 0.0040 
Vote Share 16571.76 4128.817 4.013683 0.0001 
Vote Change -13933.45 6298.174 -2.212300 0.0301 
Population 0.007104 0.001470 4.831279 0.0000 
Table 4 
Furthermore, it is possible to see from Table 4 the variable “Vote Share” once more confirms 
a positive relationship between the number of votes you attain in elections and the amount of 
likes you generate on Facebook. This, as in the previous model, has a probability value of 
0.0001. This is visualized in Figure 4. The population variable proves to be correlated with 
the number of likes generated, which, once again, means it can be proposed that political 
leaders in countries with larger populations will gain a larger number of followers on their 
Facebook accounts. The R-adjusted score for the model is 0,42 which is lower than Model 1 
yet a high number on the scale. The R-adjusted value determines the accuracy of this model 
and with the score attained it can be stated that the model holds a high accuracy.    
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Figure 4 
 
The “Vote Change” variable in Model 2 appears to be significant which was not the case 
when the regression for political parties was carried out. This proposes that a relationship 
exists between the change of electoral results and Facebook-likes. The coefficient value is 
however, somewhat surprisingly, negative. This means that if a political party’s performance 
between two elections were negative the political leader will continue to grow on Facebook 
ignoring the failure. This is an issue which this thesis has not delved deeper into and does not 
intend to explain, it is simply an observation made. This will be commented on in a later 
section of the thesis, but only briefly and without intention of answering the question of why 
this is the case. This is illustrated in Figure 5. The significance level of this relationship is 
measured to 0,0301, which is slightly less than the remaining variables. 
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Figure 5 
 
As was done with the previous model a figure illustrating the predicted probabilities was 
designed for Model 2. In Figure 6 the Y-axis represents the dependent variable Facebook-
followers and the X-axis the independent variable of right-wing populism among leaders. The 
dummy variable is once again the non-populist coded as “0”. The prediction intervals are 
located on each side of the figure in red, where the predicate possibilities for both non-
populist and right-wing populists are mapped out. The non-populist leader will on average 
generate around 175 000 likes on Facebook with a minimum of 95 000 and a maximum of 
250 000. The right-wing populist leader can expect an average of 505 000 followers on 
average with a minimum of 300 000 and a maximum of 710 000. This indicates that right-
wing populist leader on average will generate a substantially larger following than their non-
populist competitors. There is a spread between parties on the spectrum of right-wing 
populism and this concerns vote share, vote change, population and of course when looked at 
more specifically political leadership, actual political actions, and agendas. However, it seems 
that when this spectrum is viewed as a whole and they are measured as one it is clear from 
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this study’s results that they are gaining larger followings than those parties who confirm to a 
non-populist policy. It shall be stressed that this is predicted probabilities and these results are 
based upon the robustness of the study and the laws governing predictions within regression 
analyses. It is in no way a truth or a fact, it is an observation possibly opening the door for 
others who deem it necessary to explore it further.   
 
 
Figure 6 
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7. Analysis 
 
The idea of this study spawned in the fall of 2017 because of a simple observation of right-
wing populist parties on social media in the Nordic countries. That observation seemed to 
indicate that the right-wing populist parties in Sweden, Norway, Finland and Denmark were 
beating their non-populist competition on social media. There were obvious similarities 
between the countries which were taken into account, these concerned vote share for the 
populist right, population in relation to the rest of Europe and the culture of the countries. 
There were differences as to when the right-wing populist parties gained actual political 
representation on national or international level, but the theory felt strong enough to further 
study and develop. 12 countries in western Europe were selected and it was at this time 
decided that the theory possibly could be applicable on right-wing populist leaders as well as 
the parties. As the research was carried out it could be established that the right-wing populist 
parties and leaders across Europe were gaining larger followings than the remaining non-
populist parties and leaders. The findings and the dataset they were based upon are in 
themselves valuable for further studies. However, to extend the thesis from an observation to 
a possible academical answer as to why these right-wing populist parties are generating these 
numbers an analysis of the results is required.  
The thesis introduces in the sections of “previous literature” and “theory” a 
selection of academical work on the subjects of political engagement, rational choice and 
cognitive appraisal theory. A combination of the three makes up the intended theory that will 
be applied on the results found within this study. It is of importance to establish that there are 
countries among these 12 where the right-wing populist party is the largest political party 
when measuring by Facebook-likes while they are not the largest political part in vote share. 
There is in fact not a single right-wing populist party holding the largest vote share in any of 
the countries included in the study. It is therefore not as simple as saying that the largest party 
offline gets the largest following online. This thesis would however argue that political parties 
attain a majority of their Facebook-likes from a percentage of their voters, and as some 
political parties have a larger base of votes they can attain, in theory, larger amounts of 
Facebook-likes. This means that the followings of Political parties in large consist of people 
who vote for the party they have liked. Apart from the Facebook-likes which are political 
engagements performed by voters of the party this thesis argues that voters from both the 
traditional left-wing and the traditional right-wing engage with parties they do not vote for. 
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7.1 High and low-cost engagement 
 
To understand the results and present a possible explanation the thesis proposes that the 
engagement of liking something on Facebook is a low-cost engagement. In comparison a 
high-cost investment would be attending demonstrations, walking in marches, physically 
fighting for your political beliefs, or coming out to vote. These high-cost engagements cannot 
and probably should not be defined as equal in cost, however they are not to be seen as low-
cost. When discussing costs connected to political participation or engagement there is a 
plethora of studies performed and a large sum of these are based upon rational choice theory. 
In this study the collection of ideas within rational choice are not the most valuable addition, 
it is rather the specific idea that political engagement comes at a cost. Laver (1997) does 
explicitly state that it could be argued that the cost of voting can be considered a very small 
one.30 However small that cost may be this thesis argues that it will never be smaller than that 
of a Facebook-like. At least not in the current way the two engagements are carried out.  
The term “costs” in this context is hardly a set number of things, basically 
anything can be argued to be a “cost” to the person who engages in an activity. The costs 
agreed upon in a large amount of the cases are monetary loss and time-consuming activities.31 
Monetary loss can be translated to such trivial things are the leather sole of your shoe being 
worn out by you walking to the polls to vote, and time-consuming activities could be 
determined to be googling for a political parties’ standpoint on domestic affairs. Looking at 
higher costs one could bring forth the extreme possibility of dying in a violent demonstration 
or the loss of respect from your family because of voting against the beliefs of your nearest. 
As can be seen engaging yourself politically comes with costs and these costs have different 
values.  
Where does this leave the political engagement of liking a political party or a 
political leader? Previous research done on the social media platform Facebook has lead 
researchers to believe that Facebook-likes cannot be understood as cost-free engagement.32 It 
is an action where the individual is selective and decides upon interacting with the political 
party or leader based on at least one subject or preference which they both share the same 
                                                          
30 Laver, p. 94. 
31 Ibid, p. 92. 
32 Kristersen et al., p. 4. 
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standpoint upon.33 This could mean that the individual believes that a party or a leader 
represents the individuals’ best solution to a problem. When deciding what party to vote for in 
an election there are several areas of political interest wherein the individual must make 
crucial decisions. Do I believe in higher or lower taxes? Do I support the European Union, or 
do I find them to be unnecessary? Is immigration an asset or a burden? The questions 
presented as examples cannot summarize the endless number of questions a voter is faced 
with, it is a sample of the possible questions which can be presented. This large number of 
questions will all be important when the voter is deciding on which party to vote for, as the 
elected politicians will be able to rule and thus actually impact how these issues are handled.  
On Facebook however, this is not the case. The Facebook-like holds no such 
value, it gains the party or leader no actual political power. Yet the Facebook-like, as 
previously stated, cannot be believed to be completely cost-free, but rather a selective action 
where the individual shows support for at least one of a party’s standpoints. Imagine then that 
a voter could decide on the subject or subjects that he/she could support, yet the support 
would not mean actual political power. For example, the Social Democratic party in country 
X represents most of voter Ys’ beliefs, however voter Y does not think they are handling the 
refugee situation nor immigration in a satisfactory way. It is however not to the extent where 
the non-satisfactory handling of the questions concerning immigration is of larger importance 
than the collected subjects which Y is pleased with. Come election day voter Y will vote for 
the social democratic party X but up until that point he has discussed the problematic situation 
concerning immigration with friends and family, perhaps even on social media, perhaps he 
liked the populist parties Facebook page. This example is the core of the thesis, voter Y is the 
proposed difference between the numbers of likes generated by right-wing populist parties 
and their non-populist competitors.  
 
7.2 Anger, anxiety and political behavior 
 
In order to strengthen this statement academical work concerning political engagement and 
anxiety must be presented. In studying anger and anxiety connected to political participation 
Valentino et al. found that the two emotionally responses trigger different types of behavior.34 
                                                          
33 Ibid, p. 9. 
34 Valentino et al., p. 163. 
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Anger makes the individual risk-seeking in finding a solution to an issue. Risks are connected 
to costs, an individual who is willing to risk is also willing to pay the costs if the engagement 
would end poorly. This could be connected to high-cost engagements such as joining rallies 
where violence may occur. Take the case of Charlottesville, the individuals on both sides 
were aware of the hatred and the opposing views present when the two sides clashed. The 
emotional responses which has led to leaving your house and facing your opponent is based 
on a form of anger, the anger on both sides are located on two completely different parts of 
the political spectrum but it has nonetheless mobilized individuals. On the other hand, anxiety 
leads to risk-avoiding behavior, anxiety is not effective if the goal is to mobilize. Valentino Et 
al. states that because of this, anxiety within the political arena does not lead to high-cost 
engagements.35 However not participating in high-cost engagements does not mean not 
participating at all, it is in fact so that anxiety stimulates low-cost expressive actions.36 In 
conclusion it can therefore be said that anger triggers high-cost political engagement, and 
anxiety triggers low-cost expressive engagement. As stated in a previous paragraph, studies 
have found that Facebook-likes and not cost-free and this thesis would agree but also add that 
they are not costly. Few would argue that Facebook-actions are non-expressive, they are 
rather the opposite, they are expressive by nature. This would make it possible to define a 
Facebook-like as a low-cost engagement of expressive nature. The exact type of interaction 
that people who feel anxious about something would engage in. Voter Y which was 
mentioned earlier is not angry enough to join rallies, however he/she is anxious enough to 
perform a low-cost political engagement to express his/her discontent with something. The 
proposed reason as to why right-wing populist parties and leaders are larger on Facebook than 
their competitors is because of individuals who feel anxious about the specific subject the 
right-wing populist control which in turn generates the populists likes but not always votes. 
  
7.3 Populism within other political affiliations  
 
An interesting observation made in the early stages of this study was that of the Swedish party 
“Feministiskt Initiativ”, a party created to represent a feminist political entity in the Swedish 
political arena. The feminist party in Sweden is in fact the third largest political party on 
Facebook with 139 000 likes on their official Facebook account meanwhile achieving 3,1% of 
                                                          
35 Valentino et al., p. 159. 
36  Ibid, p. 160. 
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the votes in the last election. This means that the top three political parties on Facebook in 
Sweden is the right-wing populist Swedish Democrats with 150 874 likes, the social 
democratic party with 145 000 and the Feminist party with 139 000 likes. The theory of 
anxiety leads to low-cost expressive actions is according to this thesis applicable on the 
feminist party as they represent a subject which makes many anxious concerning their 
possibilities to succeed in society and their overall position in the world. They are a voice 
within the political arena pinpointing issues of gender, an issue highly debated and 
increasingly important across the entire political spectrum. Liking the feminist party on 
Facebook does not mean you will vote for them, however it does mean you support the idea 
of equality which they represent. Further studies concerning populist parties not found on the 
right-wing would have to be carried out to give this single observation any value of 
generalization. 
8. Conclusion 
 
There are certain aspects of the thesis where critique may be of interest and especially 
concerning the theory of anxiety and political participation online. The first thing that would 
come under investigation is the dataset and the countries included. One could possibly argue 
that the countries selected are not as similar as the thesis suggests and that the definition of 
right-wing populism is not sophisticated enough. It may be that there are more efficient ways 
to research the uprising of right-wing populist parties on Facebook and the author of this 
thesis then only hopes this work was a pathway to greater and more precise findings. 
Secondly the theory which functions as the explanation as to why the right-wing populists are 
gaining grounds is based on research done on actions connected to the offline world. If it is 
possible to apply these theories upon human behavior in a digitalized era is yet to be proven 
and only further research can decide whether that is the case or not.  
 In a world where the digital platforms have come to replace the analog 
equivalents in almost all aspects and has done so within a small period of time it is hard to 
propose truths just yet. When political participation was studied in America in 2011 a low-
cost engagement was placing a bumper sticker on your car37, seven years later we find 
ourselves in a situation where the new low-cost engagement are the likes on Facebook. It is 
the same anxiety concerning politically charged subjects that actives the expressive actions, 
but the costs have possibly been further reduced.  
                                                          
37 Valentino et al., p. 166. 
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 As to what the author suggests concerning further studies on the field of 
populism the next step should be focused on the eastern European countries and to 
statistically test if the theory of this thesis is applicable. Another interesting study would be on 
populist parties on the far left. Perhaps the case is that populist parties across the political 
spectrum gain larger followings and in that case a much larger dataset could be created for 
even stronger generalization. It is of the outmost importance to mention that Facebook is as a 
political tool not older than 10 years. The power, possibilities and functions of the platform 
are yet to be unleashed upon the public. The action of liking something may as of now seem 
like a simple, almost trivial action, but when gathered the collection of likes becomes endless 
ways of communications. The important question to ask is who dictates which matters are 
discussed, the political party people vote for or the party people like?  
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10. Appendix – Dataset for political parties and leaders 
 
Party FB Leader FB Country Voteshare Votechange Population 
Kesk 15141,00 13748,00 Finland 21,10 5,30 5495000 
Kok. 24451,00 4761,00 Finland 18,20 -2,20 5495000 
SDP 20092,00 8411,00 Finland 16,51 -2,60 5495000 
Sin. 707,00 3292,00 Finland   5495000 
Vihr. 38526,00 14164,00 Finland 8,53 1,30 5495000 
Vas. 27853,00 47239,00 Finland 7,13 -1,00 5495000 
RKP 7876,00 1302,00 Finland 4,88 -0,60 5495000 
KD 4395,00 14638,00 Finland 3,54 0,50 5495000 
PeruS 35054,00 31750,00 Finland 17,65 -1,40 5495000 
S 145266,00 129741,00 Sweden 31,00 0,30 9903000 
M 88378,00 33507,00 Sweden 23,30 -6,80 9903000 
C 45838,00 39217,00 Sweden 6,10 -0,50 9903000 
MP 62895,00 21663,00 Sweden 6,90 -0,40 9903000 
V 88280,00 35720,00 Sweden 5,70 0,10 9903000 
L 25543,00 1378,00 Sweden 5,40 -1,70 9903000 
KD 17022,00 18197,00 Sweden 4,60 -1,00 9903000 
SD 150874,00 131829,00 Sweden 12,90 7,20 9903000 
SocDem 94648,00 68131,00 Denmark 26,30 1,40 5731000 
Venstre 69258,00 202917,00 Denmark 19,50 -7,20 5731000 
SF 35944,00 59091,00 Denmark 4,20 -5,00 5731000 
C - Kons 33387,00 39066,00 Denmark 3,40 -1,50 5731000 
Rad-Ven 37495,00 30457,00 Denmark 4,60 -4,90 5731000 
RG-ali 81030,00  Denmark 7,80 1,10 5731000 
LA 94794,00 95672,00 Denmark 7,50 2,50 5731000 
F-EU 22381,00  Denmark   5731000 
Altern 92134,00 55911,00 Denmark 4,80  5731000 
DF 85542,00 68682,00 Denmark 21,10 8,80 5731000 
AP 132644,00 185794,00 Norway 27,40 -3,40 5233000 
Höyre 125025,00 236848,00 Norway 25,00 -1,80 5233000 
Sp 26286,00 30269,00 Norway 10,30 4,80 5233000 
SV 47921,00 34502,00 Norway 6,00 1,90 5233000 
Venstre 33980,00 16371,00 Norway 4,40 -0,80 5233000 
KrF 15509,00 34771,00 Norway 4,20 -1,40 5233000 
Gröne 63089,00 12747,00 Norway 3,20 0,40 5233000 
Röde 35440,00 13861,00 Norway 2,40 1,30 5233000 
FrP 161287,00 180790,00 Norway 15,20 -1,10 5233000 
N-VA 100533,00 40399,00 Belgium 20,30 2,90 11350000 
CD&V 11726,00 7478,00 Belgium 11,60 0,70 11350000 
Open Vld 16440,00 10651,00 Belgium 9,80 1,20 11350000 
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Sp.a 37555,00 29973,00 Belgium 8,80 -0,40 11350000 
Groen 60987,00 9438,00 Belgium 5,30 0,90 11350000 
PS 49322,00 110353,00 Belgium 11,70 -2,00 11350000 
MR 28773,00 18546,00 Belgium 9,60 0,30 11350000 
cdH 4292,00  Belgium 5,00 -0,50 11350000 
Ecolo 16912,00  Belgium 3,30 -1,50 11350000 
DéFI 3311,00 2153,00 Belgium 1,80  11350000 
PP 25494,00 14219,00 Belgium 1,50 0,20 11350000 
VB 87733,00 26962,00 Belgium 3,70 -4,10 11350000 
PSD 147118,00 143327,00 Portugal 38,60 38,70 10320000 
CDS 30398,00 77453,00 Portugal   10320000 
PS 59897,00 17103,00 Portugal 32,31 4,20 10320000 
Left Bloc 609,00 73425,00 Portugal 10,20 5,00 10320000 
PCP 4338,00  Portugal 8,30 0,40 10320000 
Os Verde 9487,00 5581,00 Portugal 1,39  10320000 
PNR 31097,00 4538,00 Portugal 0,50  10320000 
PD 212634,00 1100787,00 Italy 25,40 -7,80 60600000 
M5S 1098443,00 1988057,00 Italy 25,60  60600000 
Forza 163583,00 993685,00 Italy 21,60 -15,80 60600000 
MDP 21122,00 42477,00 Italy   60600000 
AP 10278,00 123038,00 Italy   60600000 
ALA 5794,00  Italy   60600000 
LNP 347190,00 1938208,00 Italy 4,10 -4,20 60600000 
CDU 171590,00 2521838,00 Germany 26,80 -7,30 82670000 
SPD 182905,00 466427,00 Germany 20,50 -5,20 82670000 
FDP 146871,00 245657,00 Germany 10,70 5,90 82670000 
LINKE 245145,00 62192,00 Germany 9,20 0,60 82670000 
A90/Greens 176405,00 143351,00 Germany 8,90 0,50 82670000 
CSU 201329,00 108487,00 Germany 6,20 -1,20 82670000 
AfD 383291,00 202422,00 Germany 12,60 7,90 82670000 
En March 215607,00 1963843,00 France 28,20  66900000 
LR 196206,00 16315,00 France 15,80 -11,30 66900000 
PS 136151,00  France 7,40 -22,00 66900000 
MoDem 8546,00 75433,00 France 4,10 2,30 66900000 
FI 116732,00 1049001,00 France 11,00  66900000 
PCF 55228,00 34413,00 France 2,70  66900000 
FN 467835,00 1579078,00 France 13,20 -0,40 66900000 
Conserv 638285,00 447035,00 UK 42,40 5,50 65640000 
Labour 1012515,00 1376484,00 UK 40,00 9,60 65640000 
SNP 288518,00 301116,00 UK 3,00 -1,70 65640000 
LibDem 186081,00 10019,00 UK 7,40 -0,50 65640000 
Plaid C 29470,00 35254,00 UK 0,50 -0,10 65640000 
UKIP 589763,00 775768,00 UK 1,80 -10,80 65640000 
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VVD 88505,00 101954,00 Netherlands 21,20 -5,30 17020000 
CDA 48892,00 24719,00 Netherlands 12,40 3,90 17020000 
D66 73916,00 32318,00 Netherlands 12,20 4,20 17020000 
SP 59363,00 44750,00 Netherlands 9,10 -0,50 17020000 
PvdA 42998,00 37094,00 Netherlands 5,70 -19,00 17020000 
CU 27933,00 23266,00 Netherlands 3,40 0,30 17020000 
PvdD 119465,00 32114,00 Netherlands 3,20 1,30 17020000 
50Plus 5368,00 2806,00 Netherlands 3,10 1,20 17020000 
SGP 13026,00 20921,00 Netherlands 2,10 0,00 17020000 
Denk 71025,00 81831,00 Netherlands 2,00  17020000 
FvD 137406,00 1608,00 Netherlands 1,80  17020000 
PVV 2455,00 250624,00 Netherlands 13,00 2,90 17020000 
SPÖ 103028,00 235357,00 Austria 26,90 0,10 8747000 
ÖVP 49380,00 713818,00 Austria 31,50 7,50 8747000 
PILZ  36515,00 Austria 4,40  8747000 
NEOS 81627,00 87756,00 Austria 5,30 0,30 8747000 
Grune 68925,00 12466,00 Austria 3,80 -8,60 8747000 
FPO 98029,00 764119,00 Austria 26,00 6,50 8747000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
